Urban School Decentralization and the Growth of "Portfolio Districts" by Kenneth J. Saltman
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urban School Decentralization 
and the Growth of “Portfolio Districts” 
 
 
Kenneth J. Saltman 
 
DePaul University 
 
June 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Great Lakes Center for Education Research & Practice 
PO Box 1263 
East Lansing, MI 48826 
Phone: (517) 203-2940 
Email: greatlakescenter@greatlakescenter.org 
Web Site: http://www.greatlakescenter.org  
 
 
 
 
    
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kevin Welner: Editor 
Patricia H. Hinchey: Academic Editor 
Erik Gunn: Managing Editor 
 
One of a series of Policy Briefs made possible in part by funding 
from the Great Lakes Center for Education Research and Practice. 
  
EPIC/EPRU policy briefs are peer reviewed by members of the Edi-
torial Review Board. For information on the board and its members, 
visit: http://epicpolicy.org/editorial-board 
    
     
  
Urban School Decentralization  
and the Growth of “Portfolio Districts” 
 
Kenneth J. Saltman, DePaul University 
 
Executive Summary 
 
In the latter half of the past decade, school districts in several large cities, includ-
ing New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and post-Katrina New Orleans, have 
implemented an urban school decentralization model generally known as “portfo-
lio districts.” Others, including those in Denver and Cleveland, are following suit 
in what appears to be a growing trend. The portfolio strategy has become increa-
singly prominent in educational policy circles, think tank and philanthropy litera-
ture, and education news reporting. As CEO of the Chicago Public Schools, Arne 
Duncan embraced the portfolio district model. His appointment as U.S. Secretary 
of Education suggests the Obama administration also supports the approach. The 
premise of the portfolio strategy is that if superintendents build portfolios of 
schools that encompass a variety of educational approaches offered by different 
vendors, then over time school districts will weed out under-performing ap-
proaches and vendors; as a result, more children will have more opportunities for 
academic success. This brief examines the available evidence for the viability of 
this premise and the proposals that flow from it. 
 
The portfolio district approach merges four strategies: 1) decentralization; 2) char-
ter school expansion; 3) reconstituting/closing “failing” schools; and 4) test-based 
accountability. Additionally, portfolio district restructuring often involves firing 
an underperforming school’s staff in its entirety, whether or not the school is re-
constituted as a charter school. In this model, the portfolio district is conceptua-
lized as a circuit of “continuous improvement.” Schools are assessed based on test 
scores; if their scores are low, they are subject to being closed and reopened as 
charters. The replacement charters are subsequently subject to test-based assess-
ment and, if scores remain disappointing, to possible closure and replacement by 
still other contractors. The portfolio district concept implements what has been 
since the 1990’s discussed in educational policy literature as market-based “crea-
tive destruction” or “churn.”1 This perspective considers public schools to be 
comparable to private enterprise, with competition a key element to success. Just 
as businesses that cannot turn sufficient profit, schools that cannot produce test 
scores higher than competitors’ must be “allowed” to “go out of business.” The 
appeal of the portfolio district strategy is that it appears to offer an approach suffi-
ciently radical to address longstanding and intractable problems in public schools. 
 
Although the strategy is being advocated by some policy centers, implemented by 
some large urban districts, and promoted by the education reforms proposed as 
part of the Obama administrations Race to the Top initiative, no peer-reviewed 
    
     
  
studies of portfolio districts exist, meaning that no reliable empirical evidence 
about portfolio effects is available that supports either the implementation or re-
jection of the portfolio district reform model. Nor is such evidence likely to be 
forthcoming. Even advocates acknowledge the enormous difficulty of designing 
credible empirical studies to determine how the portfolio approach affects student 
achievement and other outcomes. There are anecdotal reports of achievement 
gains in one portfolio district, New Orleans. The New Orleans results, however, 
have been subjected to serious challenge. Extrapolation of research on the consti-
tuent elements of the model is not helpful because of the complex interactions of 
these elements within the portfolio model. Moreover, even when the constituent 
elements are considered as a way to predict the likely success of the model, no 
evidence is found to suggest that it will produce gains in either achievement or 
fiscal efficiency. Finally, the policy writing of supporters of the portfolio model 
suggests that the approach is expensive to implement and may have negative ef-
fects on student achievement. 
 
In light of these considerations, it is recommended that policymakers and admin-
istrators use caution in considering the portfolio district approach. It is also highly 
recommended that before adopting such a strategy, decision makers ask the fol-
lowing questions. 
 
 What credible evidence do we have, or can we obtain, that suggests the portfo-
lio model offers advantages compared to other reform models? What would 
those advantages be, when might they be expected to materialize, and how 
might they be documented? 
 If constituent elements of the model (such as charter schools and test-based ac-
countability) have not produced advantages outside of portfolio systems, what 
is the rationale for expecting improved outcomes as part of a portfolio system? 
 What funding will be needed for startup, and where will it come from? 
 What funding will be necessary for maintenance of the model? Where will 
continuation funds come from if startup funds expire and are not renewed? 
 How will the cost/benefit ratio of the model be determined? 
 What potential political and social conflicts seem possible? How will concerns 
of dissenting constituents be addressed? 
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Urban School Decentralization  
and the Growth of “Portfolio Districts” 
 
Kenneth J. Saltman, DePaul University 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Current Trends 
In the latter half of the past decade, school districts in several large cities, 
including New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., and post-Katrina New Orleans, 
have implemented a new model of urban school decentralization often called 
“portfolio districts.” Others, including those in Denver and Cleveland, are follow-
ing suit in what appears to be a growing trend. The portfolio strategy has become 
increasingly prominent in educational policy circles, think tank and philanthropy 
literature, and education news reporting. The appointment of Chicago Public 
Schools CEO Arne Duncan as U. S. Secretary of Education suggests administra-
tion support for the concept.2 Duncan embraced such decentralization in Chicago 
in the form of Renaissance 2010 and continues promoting its elements in such na-
tional policy as Race to the Top and in proposed revisions to the No Child Left 
Behind legislation. The premise supporting portfolio districts is that if education 
vendors compete on the basis of proposed innovations, with a school superinten-
dent monitoring activities, children will receive greater opportunity for academic 
success. This brief examines the available evidence for the viability of this pre-
mise and the proposals (for example, making all schools in a district charter 
schools) that flow from it. 
A number of urban districts have embraced or are considering adopting 
the portfolio model. National policy also favors the idea. However, there have 
been no substantive studies of the portfolio district approach. The only relevant 
research to date has been on its constituent elements, which include 1) decentrali-
zation; 2) charter school expansion; 3) reconstituting/closing “failing” schools; 
and 4) test-based accountability.3 As detailed below, the available scholarly peer-
reviewed evidence on these various constituent elements shows no effect or nega-
tive effects on student achievement and on educational costs. 
The published policy literature advocating implementation of the portfolio 
model and its elements most often makes assertions without providing credible 
evidence for its claims. For example, all of the relevant six articles available from 
the scholarly database Academic Search Premiere write favorably of the portfolio 
model, but none of them either constitute or reference careful empirical study re-
viewed by a community of policy scholars. Much of such advocacy writing pub-
lished about the portfolio model and its constituent elements is generated by au-
thors housed in or connected to policy think tanks that tend to have political and 
policy agendas. Lacking to date are studies by independent scholars who are con-
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cerned with accurate information rather than with a result supporting a precon-
ceived policy agenda.4 In terms of advocacy publications, a single market-
oriented think tank, the Center on Reinventing Public Education (CRPE), seems 
to have cornered the market on promoting the implementation of the portfolio 
model. While CRPE describes itself as conducting independent research, it gener-
ally advocates a number of market-oriented approaches to school reform (pay for 
performance, charters, choice), publishes the most outspoken advocates of im-
agining public schooling as a private consumable (Paul Hill, Jane Hannaway, Eric 
Hanushek), and shares researchers with the market-oriented think tank The Urban 
Institute.5 
Some readers may be surprised to learn that there is a scarcity of research 
on portfolio districts or such constituent elements as closures because there is an 
abundance of policy literature, published especially by think tanks. But as noted 
above, little of this literature has been peer reviewed, little has been based in em-
pirical study, and much has been challenged.6 So while the elements of the portfo-
lio model are much discussed, in reality we know very little that is based in em-
pirical evidence and that has been reviewed by a community of scholars.7 
 If we ask the question as to why the portfolio model has been imple-
mented without the support of such evidence, there are at least three possible an-
swers: 1) advocacy literature is being accepted as evidence; 2) the constituent 
elements of the portfolio approach appear to add up to reasonable model because 
they each appear to be supported by credible evidence; 3) some advocates assume 
that evidence is not necessary because the public system has “failed” and now it is 
time to give radical experiments a chance. 
 
 
Early Forms of Decentralization: Administrative and Community Control 
It is important to understand that the portfolio model differs radically from 
the district “decentralization” reforms of the 1980’s. Writing in the journal Urban 
Education in 1991,Wolhstetter and McCurdy characterized the earlier decentrali-
zation trends as follows: “Cloaked in many terms—restructuring, school-based 
management, shared decision making—school decentralization shifts formal deci-
sion making from the central administration to a smaller decision-making arena—
the school. Decentralized schools alter the educational power structure by empo-
wering school personnel, community groups, or both to make decisions about 
budgets, personnel, and programs.”8 
In the early 1990s, school decentralization generally took one of two 
forms. One was administrative decentralization, which moved the power to make 
some decisions from a district’s central administration to smaller units within the 
district. In this form, decision-making authority moved downward while accoun-
tability remained at the top with the central administration and the board of educa-
tion. A typical example was School Based Management (SBM)/Shared Decision 
Making (SDM), implemented in Miami in 1987-88. SDM involved “allow[ing] 
teachers and principals to develop their own system for the total management of 
their individual schools, with minimum direction from higher authority.”9 
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A second form of decentralization, community control, shifted both deci-
sion-making and accountability for outcomes to the local community, including 
citizens and other non-education specialists. One example occurred in Chicago in 
1988, after Chicago was singled out as the worst urban school district in the na-
tion by then Secretary of Education William Bennett and after an unusual coali-
tion of business people and parents lobbied the state legislature for dramatic 
change. This community-controlled decentralization was implemented with mixed 
results.10 
In both administrative and community control versions of decentralization, 
teachers, local administrators, and teachers’ unions had varying degrees of decision 
making authority, with community control adding community representatives to the 
mix. Administrative control is approached differently in the portfolio model. 
 
 
The New Decentralization: Portfolio Districts 
As in the case of administrative decentralization, portfolio districts shift 
administrative decision making to local educational units while central adminis-
tration retains accountability for educational outcomes. A significant difference is 
that the portfolio approach shifts control downward—not to schools or units of 
schools administered collaboratively by local administrators, teachers, communi-
ties, and unions, but instead by largely moving control to educational contractors. 
These include for-profit and non-profit charter school operators, educational man-
agement organizations, or charter management organizations.11 
Administrative and community control decentralization peaked in popular-
ity in the late 1980s, by which time 14 states had adopted some form of decentra-
lization. By the early to mid-1990s disenchantment with the approach had begun 
to set in and the push for state takeover of failing districts or placing those dis-
tricts under direct mayoral control began.12 The portfolio model combines an em-
phasis on highly concentrated control at the top of the district with downward del-
egation to contractors who are expected to demonstrate high performance in re-
turn for relative autonomy. The four large urban districts that have implemented 
the portfolio model have district heads who report either to a mayor who has tak-
en control of the district or, in the case of New Orleans, to a state that has seized 
control of the district from the city. The top-down retention of administrative con-
trol is far more extensive than in older forms of decentralization, and the down-
ward delegation of administrative control goes to different parties—that is, to con-
tractors.13 
This portfolio approach draws on the metaphor of stock investment. The 
district superintendent is imagined as a stock investor who has a portfolio of in-
vestments (schools). The superintendent creates a portfolio of contractors and 
subsequently holds the investments that “perform” (in terms of student achieve-
ment) and ends the contracts (or sells) those investments that “don’t perform.” 
The approach merges four radical restructuring ideas14: 1) decentralization; 2) 
charter school expansion; 3) school closures with charter replacements; and 4) ac-
countability, largely through testing.15 The portfolio district is imagined as a cir-
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cuit of continuous improvement in which schools are assessed based on test 
scores. If scores are low, schools are subject to possible closure (or mass firings) 
and to being reopened as charters. If the charters subsequently fail to show desired 
improvements, they in turn are subject to possible closure and replacement by still 
other contractors. The portfolio district concept puts into place what has been in-
creasingly discussed in educational policy literature as market-based “creative de-
struction” or “churn.”16   
This perspective considers public schools to be comparable to private en-
terprise, with competition a key element to success. Like businesses that cannot 
turn sufficient profit, schools that cannot produce test scores higher than competi-
tors’ must be “allowed” to “go out of business.” This metaphor persists in educa-
tion policy despite frequent observations that the correspondence between enter-
prise and education is highly questionable at best. It assumes markets to be com-
petitive rather than monopolistic, and it presumes government regulation to be at 
odds with markets. In reality, certain industries (entertainment, defense, telecom-
munications, transportation, agriculture, for example) are monopolistic with sig-
nificant barriers to entry, while the private sector may rely on the public sector, 
government intervention, or both for survival (recent government subsidy and 
regulation of the financial and automotive industries to save them from collapse, 
for example). In addition, unlike industry, public education cannot control its 
“raw materials”—that is, its students. Despite these difficulties, the metaphor 
persists and this reasoning drives the portfolio model. 
 
 
Review of Research 
 
 
Methods 
 
Given the prominence of the portfolio model, it is important to understand 
what evidence supports the approach, especially in the two areas of particular interest 
in policy discussions, student achievement and cost. Both achievement as measured 
by standardized tests and cost are highly contested measures of educational value, but 
the issue of how best to measure school improvement is beyond the scope of this 
work. Therefore, this discussion does not address assumptions or debates about the 
value of measuring educational quality in either or both of these terms.17 
The following review is based on a search of the Academic Search Pre-
miere database, incorporating all available sub-databases.18  
 
 
Evidence and the Portfolio District Approach 
 
While there is a large body of educational policy research on decentraliza-
tion, nearly all of this research takes up earlier versions of decentralization that 
emphasize either local administrative or community control. There have been no 
peer-reviewed scholarly studies of the portfolio model. Nor have there been non-
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peer-reviewed empirical studies of it. Instead, available literature offers sugges-
tions and strategies for implementation as well as arguments for the approach and 
cautions about potential pitfalls. 
While studies of earlier approaches to decentralizing school districts do 
exist, they offer little help in comprehending the potential effects of portfolio dis-
tricts because the delegation of power to contractors differs so strikingly from ear-
lier delegation to school personnel, organizations and communities. Much more 
relevant to evaluation of the portfolio model might be existing studies of the ef-
fects of public school privatization through contracting with for-profit or non-
profit providers. However, these studies would not account for other elements of 
portfolio district approach and their impact on such contracting. That is, the port-
folio approach merges contracting with several other major reform strategies, in-
cluding charter school expansion, school closures with charter replacements, and 
test-based accountability. Because these diverse strands are so intertwined in port-
folio districts, earlier studies focused primarily on the shift of authority can offer 
little or no information about whether the approach will do what its proponents 
hope: raise student achievement scores, decrease costs, or both. 
In theory, it might be possible to evaluate elements of the portfolio district 
model in isolation and then speculate as to their combined effects. However, this 
prospect is problematic because each element will likely affect the others, render-
ing individual assessment of each element difficult or impossible. For example, 
the strategy of charter school development has been studied independently, yield-
ing mixed to slightly negative effects on student achievement.19 However, when 
charters are implemented in a mix of strategies that might include school closures, 
mass firings, test-based assessment and possibly special funding, it becomes vir-
tually impossible to measure the effectiveness of the charter component. The port-
folio district created in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina is a case in point.20 
When the New Orleans public schools were closed and networks of char-
ter schools subsequently opened there, a large number of students had been dis-
placed by the storm. In addition, a large sum of money was put into the charter 
schools created in the new Recovery School District (RSD). Much of that money 
came from large philanthropic organizations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and the Broad Foundation. Assessing the effectiveness of the RSD 
charters relative to the schools they replaced would require somehow: 
 accounting for the displacement of students due to the storm;  
 accounting for the resulting racial and class demographic shifts; and,  
 accounting for the infusion of money into the RSD charters by grant 
givers and government.  
A more meaningful interpretation would also need to take into account the 
history of public disinvestment in the district and professional class white flight 
that resulted in the worst-funded public school district in the nation prior to the 
storm. Claims about improvements yielded by RSD charters are currently hotly 
contested and as yet unsubstantiated by peer-reviewed research. Paul Vallas, who 
heads the RSD, and Paul Pastorek, the state superintendent, laud student achieve-
ment gains in RSD schools and are expanding the RSD throughout Louisiana by 
requiring principals to sign memorandums of understanding that their schools are 
    
     
                                    6 of 23 
 
 
subject to test-based accountability and potential closure, chartering or other re-
structuring. However, Thomas Robichaux of the Orleans Parish School Board 
contends that while achievement scores in the RSD schools have risen, RSD gains 
have lagged relative to the Orleans Parish schools, despite the fact that RSD 
schools enjoy roughly twice the per-pupil infusion of money.21 
The difficulties of assessing the impact of individual elements of the port-
folio district approach suggest that the best and possibly the only way to know 
whether the strategy achieves its aims is to evaluate it as a whole. As discussed 
below, even the most outspoken proponents of the portfolio approach offer the 
post-Katrina New Orleans example as a demonstration of how difficult it is to 
measure achievement gains in the portfolio approach. As noted above, while no 
peer-reviewed studies of the portfolio district approach in its entirety have ap-
peared, a search of relevant literature did yield six articles on the topic.22 None of 
these, however, sheds any light on the question of whether improvements in 
achievement or cost have been realized. The lack of evidence has not deterred 
proponents from issuing reports and arguments offering both promises and warn-
ings. Most of these publications are very brief (a single paragraph to three pages) 
promotions for the portfolio idea, unsupported by evidence. 
Unique to the literature, but also unsupported by peer-reveiwed scholarly 
empirical evidence, is an October 2009 report issued by the Center on Reinventing 
Public Education (CRPE) at the University of Washington, whose advocacy efforts 
are mentioned above. Titled Portfolio School Districts for Big Cities: An Interim 
Report, the report advocates portfolio district development and implementation: 
“To telegraph this report’s message: the portfolio idea has great promise, but mak-
ing it work requires a great deal of time, money, and political capital applied over 
many years. No locality is likely to benefit by adopting it temporarily as a ‘flavor of 
the month’ or by cherry picking some parts of it and leaving other parts unimple-
mented.”23 However, the report informs readers that, “it is too soon to make a bot-
tom-line assessment of the effects of the portfolio idea on student achievement, but 
[this report] suggests how such an assessment can (and in what ways it should not) 
be done.”24 This interim report is to be followed in 2011 by a fuller report on per-
formance, but the interim report warns that it is likely to be impossible in the future 
to evaluate whether the portfolio district approach has been successful: 
 
It is unlikely, however, that we can ever give a simple answer to 
the question, “Have the cities that adopted a portfolio strategy be-
nefited from it?” This is so for several reasons, including that dis-
tricts started in different places and moved at different paces to-
ward full implementation ... Everyone will want to judge the port-
folio approach according to whether students learned more or less 
than before. But this will be easier said than done. Crude juxtaposi-
tions—like comparing city students’ average gains to average 
gains statewide—leave too many differentiating factors (e.g. im-
migration, transiency, family disruptions) uncontrolled.25 
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Thus, the report promotes the portfolio district strategy even as it acknowledges it 
may be impossible ever to demonstrate clear benefits from it. 
CRPE’s interim report also notes the difficulty of assessing individual 
components of the portfolio as an indirect measurement of its overall potential: 
“A piecemeal approach—for example, calculating gain scores for students who 
attended new schools and comparing them to gains in the rest of the district—
could easily produce misleading results.”26 In addition, CRPE warns against over-
ly optimistic expectations: “Though new schools are at the core of a portfolio 
strategy, success in every case should not be expected. There is a risk of failure in 
creating new schools, even if they imitate existing successful schools. Nor is it 
clear how long it should take for new schools to reach their full potential with re-
spect to student performance.”27 
Thus CRPE, the staunchest advocate for portfolio districts, offers several 
cautions about the portfolio strategy—including some about measuring achieve-
ment, making it difficult to understand the rationale for its undaunted support of 
the approach. On the one hand, the report clearly states that CRPE considers stu-
dent achievement the most important measure of improvement: 
 
 Thus, the bottom-line question is whether districtwide gain scores 
have improved continuously over time, not only for students on 
average but also for poor and minority students formerly assigned 
to schools with very average gains. These questions could be ans-
wered districtwide, for different levels of schooling, or for differ-
ent demographic groups.28 
 
Yet on the other hand, in the very next sentence, the report acknowledges that this 
is “a very difficult analysis, given the need to follow large numbers of students 
over several years, and to take full account of changes in neighborhood and 
school demographic competition.” Even more surprising than this observation that 
it is doubtful whether the stipulated criteria for success can be reliably measured 
is the observation that no reliable empirical evidence exists to support the strategy 
nonetheless being promoted: “Despite the claims of proponents and critics alike, 
no existing study can be considered definitive because none has used this form of 
analysis” (emphasis added).29 The CRPE report goes on to propose other ways to 
assess the value and success of the portfolio approach, including “observing 
changes in the schools available, their distribution among neighborhoods, ability 
of poor and minority children to get into their first choices of schools, teacher 
turnover and the numbers of teachers applying for jobs in schools serving low-
income and minority neighborhoods, etc.”30 Thus, having stated that the measure 
of success must be achievement gains, the report notes that no definitive evidence 
exists to support the expectation of gains and that no way to measure gains attri-
butable to the portfolio approach is on the horizon. Despite this apparently signif-
icant difficulty, CRPE persists in its advocacy, simply suggesting a menu of indi-
rect measures of portfolio success. 
While no comprehensive scholarly study of the portfolio district approach 
has been undertaken, some partial assessments of student achievement and costs 
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have been made in two of the four large urban districts implementing the strategy. 
In Chicago, the Chicago Tribune analyzed state student test data for Renaissance 
2010 schools and found that “Scores from the elementary schools created under 
Renaissance 2010 are nearly identical to the city average, and scores at the re-
made high schools are below the already abysmal city average.”31 The article con-
tinues with other concerns about Chicago’s portfolio approach. “The moribund 
test scores follow other less than enthusiastic findings about Renaissance 2010—
that displaced students ended up mostly in other low-performing schools and that 
mass closings led to youth violence as rival gang members ended up in the same 
classrooms. Together, they suggest the initiative hasn’t lived up to its promise by 
this, its target year.”32 
Three other partial studies of Renaissance 2010 have appeared. One33 was 
funded by the Renaissance Schools Fund, the funding arm of Renaissance 2010, 
which has raised $50 million to spend on the portfolio approach. Thus far RSF 
has awarded $30 million to 63 new schools. The RSF-funded report conducted by 
SRI found that “children in the fund-supported schools had low academic perfor-
mance and posted test score gains identical to students in nearby neighborhood 
schools.”34 This evaluation does not account for other effects of the school closure 
dimension of the portfolio approach. The Chicago Consortium on School Re-
search at the University of Chicago studied the effects of the Renaissance 2010 
closures, finding that “students from closed schools landed, for the most part, at 
campuses that were just as bad and then progressed at the same predictably low 
levels.”35 It also found that students from closed schools who then attended high-
er-performing schools experienced a positive impact in terms of academic 
progress—but these were in the minority. 
Despite inconclusive or negative results, Ron Huberman, the successor 
CEO to Arne Duncan in Chicago, has made clear that he will expand the initia-
tive. Renaissance 2010 was initiated by the Civic Committee of the Commercial 
Club of Chicago (a century-old organization representing Chicago corporations), 
which commissioned corporate consultant A.T. Kearney to write the school plan. 
Mayor Daley, who has control over Chicago Public Schools, has championed the 
approach as well, framing the discussion in such familiar metaphorical market 
terms as “competition,” “choice,” and public-private partnerships. Although Hu-
berman’s administration has not yet issued a study, he “said he has crunched the 
numbers and about one-third of the new schools are outperforming their neigh-
borhood counterparts; one-third are identical in performance; the rest do worse.”36 
The difficulties of evaluating the portfolio approach in Chicago is heightened by 
the ways that school closures were done, with closings based not only on alleged 
test scores but also on claims about building under-utilization. Critics of the 
school closures have alleged uneven criteria and have suggested that the pattern of 
school closures and chartering aligned with urban gentrification plans. 
In New Orleans’ RSD, partial evidence is less clear than in Chicago. Six 
scholarly peer-reviewed articles had appeared as of March 5, 2010, but none included 
achievement data or cost data. As noted above, student achievement outcomes and 
relative costs are vigorously debated. Defenders of the RSD point to the Stanford 
CREDO study37 of charters nationwide, which shows charters faring on par to worse 
    
     
                                    9 of 23 
 
 
than traditional public schools in student achievement, but which showed Louisiana 
charters faring better than traditional public schools. Critics of the study have ques-
tioned its methodology and selective use of data as well as the potential effects of un-
equal financial investments in charter versus non-charter schools.38 
CPRE’s interim report, discussed above, also addressed costs of portfolio 
implementation. It reported that the four large urban districts continued to pay for 
“salaries, other instructional costs, and facilities rent and maintenance” while phi-
lanthropy provided funds for innovation.39 The amounts and uses of philanthropic 
funds differed in the districts, with some supporting charter management organi-
zations, some supporting test-based database tracking projects, some funding an 
effort to encourage teachers to give up tenure for higher salaries or pay for per-
formance, and some funding the creation of an independent research institution. 
While the exact amounts of money spent on portfolio district initiatives 
are not known, CRPE estimates that 
 
The amounts available have been significant, by some accounts as 
high as $200 million in New York City, half that amount in Chica-
go, and over $50 million in New Orleans. Philanthropic contribu-
tions to D.C. have been smaller to date, in part because the district 
has barely started to build external support organizations and in 
part because foundations are waiting to fulfill their pledges to the 
new teacher salary scheme.40 
 
This dependence upon philanthropic funding for innovation generates uncertainty 
about future costs and future financing in portfolio districts. CRPE hopes that a 
future report will be able to answer this critical question: “can the new support or-
ganizations, once established, operate on fees received from schools and the dis-
trict, or will they require continued foundation funding?”41 
This question about future funding raises other as yet unanswered questions 
about whether philanthropic foundations will have the resources and the will to 
continue portfolio funding, whether districts will have the resources and the will to 
replace any withdrawn foundation funding, or whether some as yet unidentified 
source of funding will be found to cover any future gap. Other complexities regard-
ing foundation financing involve the uses of private foundation funds to “leverage” 
public spending in directions that may be at odds with the public will and public in-
terest. In particular, the large “venture philanthropies”—Gates, Broad, and Wal-
ton—have been successful at using publicly subsidized foundation wealth strategi-
cally to influence elements of privatization-oriented portfolio reform, including 
charter school expansion, vouchers, “neovouchers” or publicly funded tax credits 
for private tuition, linkage of teacher pay to test-based achievement, and school tur-
naround and closure efforts.42 Whether public policy is best driven by private 
wealth is a critical question, although it is beyond the scope of this work. 
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Evidence and Constituent Elements of Portfolio District Approach 
 
The proponents of the portfolio district approach at the Center for Rein-
venting Public Education make a strong case that the complexity of the portfolio 
approach makes it difficult to evaluate, and that it should not be evaluated or im-
plemented piecemeal. Yet, legislators, administrators and other decision makers 
may be tempted to ignore such cautions if there were evidence that one or several 
elements of the approach had demonstrated effectiveness. It may therefore be use-
ful to demonstrate that even if it were reasonable to evaluate the approach in 
terms of the promise of its constituent elements, there still is no evidence availa-
ble to support its implementation. 
As noted above, studies of earlier decentralization efforts are of little value 
because the portfolio model differs radically from earlier approaches. A meaningful 
study would need to focus on how shifting control to boards of contractors affected 
student achievement and administrative cost, but no evidence exists on this topic. 
Also lacking is evidence on the effects of contracting when merged with more con-
centrated superintendent control under mayoral or state takeover. Therefore, the on-
ly constituent elements of the portfolio approach that have been rigorously studied 
are charter schools, school closures and turnarounds, and test-based accountability. 
Studies of charter school affects on achievement show mixed to negative 
results in comparison to traditional public schools, and they offer no information 
on comparative costs.43 Of 93 peer-reviewed scholarly articles available on school 
closures, none offer empirical evidence regarding their effects on student 
achievement or cost; five available peer-reviewed studies of turnarounds also of-
fer no information on these criteria. The impact of test-based accountability can 
be evaluated based on the successes or failures of No Child Left Behind. Between 
2008 and 2010, 53 peer-reviewed articles available in full text form were pub-
lished on “No Child Left Behind” and “Student Achievement.”44 Of the 53, the 
vast majority raised methodological, theoretical, and practical problems with this 
experiment in test-based accountability. None frame NCLB as demonstrating the 
effectiveness of test-based accountability, although some do retain hope for the 
concept. Available evidence suggests, however, that on the whole NCLB has 
failed to raise student achievement or to close the racial “achievement gap.”45 The 
literature also reflects concerns about cost because federal funding allocated was 
insufficient to fund the testing agenda—and even the insufficient amount prom-
ised was never fully provided.46 
 
Table 1. Summary of Scholarly Peer-Reviewed Evidence Available 
on Portfolio District Approach 
 
 Student Achievement Cost 
New York Data unavailable Data unavailable 
Chicago Data unavailable Data unavailable 
New Orleans Data unavailable Data unavailable 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Data unavailable Data unavailable 
Based on searches on Academic Search Premiere as of 3/6/10. 
    
     
                                    11 of 23 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of Scholarly Peer-Reviewed Evidence Available 
on Constituent Elements of Portfolio District Approach 
 
 Student Achievement Cost 
Portfolio  
 Decentralization 
Data unavailable Data unavailable 
Charter School  
Creation 
Mixed to Negative Evidence Data unavailable 
School Closure Data unavailable Data unavailable 
Test-based 
Accountability47 
Negative Evidence Data unavailable 
School Turnarounds Data unavailable Data unavailable 
Teacher Pay for 
Test Performance 
Data unavailable Data unavailable 
Based on searches of peer-reviewed scholarly articles on Academic Search Premiere as of 3/6/10. 
 
Table 3. Evidence Available on Portfolio District Approach 
Based in Proponents’ Claims 
 
 Student Achievement Costs in Addition to  
Regular District Funding 
New York Data unavailable $200 million 
Chicago Data unavailable $100 million 
New Orleans Data unavailable $50 million (minimum) 
Washington, D.C. Data unavailable Data unavailable 
Based on the report “Portfolio School Districts for Big Cities: An Interim Report” Center on Rein-
venting Public Education.48 
 
 
Discussion and Analysis 
 
 
Lacking Evidence, the Lessons of Experience 
As indicated above, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the port-
folio approach will deliver the achievement gains that advocates like CRPE con-
sider its “bottom-line” benefit. Proponents acknowledge that definitive measures 
of student achievement that can account for the complexity of the proposed radi-
cal changes do not exist. Rather than predicting that such analytic tools can and 
will be developed, CRPE encourages alternative, indirect means of measuring 
success. Moreover, it counsels patience in awaiting positive results: “Friends and 
enemies of the portfolio approach will seize on quick results, but their claims can 
serve political ends, not render balanced judgment of a complex and long-term 
strategy.”49 
Administrators and legislators ought to be aware of just how significant 
the problems with achievement measurement in portfolio districts are—as even 
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advocates acknowledge. No evidence exists to suggest student achievement gains 
can be expected; no expectation exists for the development of analytic tools capa-
ble of measuring the portfolio approach’s effect on achievement, its central prom-
ise. This situation presents administrators and legislators with the difficult task of 
justifying “reform” with no supporting achievement evidence and no foreseeable 
possibility of such evidence. Add to this unknown and currently unknowable in-
formation on student achievement, the clearer picture of high financial costs, ef-
fects of those high costs on other public expenditures, uncertainties for future 
funding, political fallout, and the potential adverse effect of the reform on other 
tried and true educational reforms (reduced class size, for example, or compre-
hensive social support programs linked to educational reforms, as in the Harlem 
Children’s Zone), and in sum, the portfolio district approach looks like a recipe 
for high risk and no clear reward. Experience to date offers reason to expect such 
negative complications. 
As discussed above, existing portfolio implementation has been expensive, 
and future financial support for it is uncertain. Large philanthropies such as Gates 
and Broad, known as “venture philanthropies,” have provided substantive fund-
ing, understanding schooling as “private consumable service” that “promotes 
business remedies, reforms, and assumptions.”50 Although educational philanth-
ropy accounts for just a fraction of educational spending in the U.S., its institu-
tions have recently acquired disproportionate influence and control over educa-
tional policy and practice.51 While such philanthropies provide seed money to 
promote what they term “reform,” if the federal government were to encourage 
continuation of the seeded portfolio approaches, the impact on district funding 
could be enormous. Even the Center for Reinventing Public Education suggests 
that a problem with the portfolio approach is that philanthropic support can dry 
up. However, they do not explore how such philanthropically supported initiatives 
as teacher bonus pay (Washington, D.C.), research institutes (New York City), or 
ancillary support for charter development, when suddenly defunded by the phi-
lanthropies, may require districts to choose between core operations expenditures 
and portfolio initiatives.52 It is worth considering that districts might be forced to 
move limited resources away from such areas as teacher pay, physical site, main-
tenance, and materials and into infrastructure for various portfolio initiatives. This 
scenario is especially likely because short-run federal stimulus money supporting 
teacher salaries from 2009 is running out even as states and districts face budget 
shortfalls at levels not seen for decades. 
Social and political strife also seem likely complications in portfolio dis-
tricts, as has been seen in Chicago and New Orleans, and more recently in the 
Providence incident discussed above. Social conflict in Chicago made interna-
tional news when neighborhood gang lines were disregarded in the closing and 
opening of schools under Renaissance 2010. This corporate-instituted portfolio 
plan in the mayor-controlled district resulted in Fenger High School opening with 
100% new faculty and students imported from various closed neighborhood 
schools. As a result, the school’s teachers, staff, and administrators lacked crucial 
knowledge of the community and the students to prevent a melee that resulted in 
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the much publicized death of student Derrion Albert, widely watched on the Web. 
George Schmidt of Substance News wrote, 
 
But more than most other gang induced murders in Chicago—and 
affecting the public schools—the murder of Derrion Albert is the 
result not only of the city’s massive drug gang problem, but of the 
Chicago Board of Education’s policies of “New Schools” and 
“School Turnaround.” By closing Calumet, Engelwood, and Carv-
er high schools—and forcing the most challenging students from 
those schools into Fenger and nearby schools—Mayor Daley and 
Chicago schools officials appointed by him guaranteed that Fenger 
would “fail.” When Fenger failed, Daley’s school board voted to 
fire all of Fenger’s teachers and force a program called “turna-
round” on Fenger. The destabilization resulted in chaos in Septem-
ber 2009.53 
 
Such intentional instability (churn, creative destruction) is central to the portfolio 
model. Urban districts may benefit most, however, from thoughtful and planned 
efforts to create stability and to nurture social attachments in order to strengthen 
communities that are already destabilized by a historical legacy of disinvestment, 
racialized poverty, and violence. Geoffrey Canada’s Harlem Children’s Zone is, 
for example, a highly publicized example of a comprehensive, community-based 
development project that incorporates efforts at public and private supports for 
development throughout the lifespan. 
In addition, and in direct contrast to earlier decentralization efforts that 
moved control into the hands of local school personnel, the portfolio model em-
beds as strategy mass firings and the exclusion of teachers, community members, 
and unions from local administrative processes. Associated complications include 
the effects of de-unionization on teacher work conditions, hiring of certified (and 
uncertified) teachers, and retention of experienced teachers. The practical effects 
of such significant and potentially disruptive changes in portfolio districts are un-
studied, although difficulties of staffing poor schools with qualified teachers are 
already well known.54 
 
 
What Is Driving Portfolio District Approach? 
The closure of traditional public schools and the opening of charter 
schools are central elements of the portfolio district approach. Therefore, it may 
make sense to understand the portfolio strategy less as an initiative for decentrali-
zation and more as an initiative for privatization. In fact, advocates of the portfo-
lio district strategy, including the Center on Reinventing Public Education, the 
venture philanthropies, and the Secretary of Education, support portfolio ap-
proaches because they put in place privatized choice schemes that allegedly intro-
duce “market discipline” in the form of competition and choice.55 While the con-
tentious issue of privatization is, like the question of private control of education 
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in a democracy, beyond the scope of this work, those considering the portfolio 
approach might consider the possibility that at least some of the enthusiasm for 
portfolio districts may be vested in their ability to promote a privatization agenda. 
Despite widespread enthusiasm for privatization, the evidence does not suggest 
that for-profit or non-profit private schools outperform traditional public schools 
in terms of student achievement, as illustrated by Philadelphia’s ambitious expe-
riment with varied providers.56 
To return to the portfolio approach on its own terms, without reference to 
the possibility of other agendas, the justification for it seems to rest on metaphori-
cal business images that substitute for evidence. As discussed above, a key portfo-
lio metaphor casts the district head as a manager buying and selling investments 
(schools and contractors) based on their profitability (achievement scores). This 
seems a less-than-compelling rationale, since no stock investor wants to create a 
portfolio of investments without evidence of future earnings growth or other evi-
dence of increases in stock value. However, and to put it bluntly, non-profit and 
for-profit charters and the other “investments” available to districts look no bet-
ter—and perhaps worse—“investments” than traditional public schools. There is 
no evidence that the strategies of turning over school after school (churn, or crea-
tive destruction) or of making public schools compete with contractors will en-
hance achievement. While the available evidence on charter schools may not be a 
reliable indicator of their performance in complex portfolio districts, it is difficult 
to comprehend how the added stresses and instabilities of closing and opening 
schools creates an advantage for a charter system. To date, evidence suggests that 
on the whole charters perform no better than, and sometimes even worse than, 
traditional public schools.57 It is unclear why portfolio advocates would expect 
better results in a portfolio system. 
A second prominent metaphor is that the “government monopoly” of pub-
lic schooling has “failed,” and now it is time to “give the market a chance.” This 
accusation is selectively applied. U.S. schools score on par with other industria-
lized nations in international comparisons,58 despite having a uniquely local and 
unequal funding structure, meaning that the U.S. is on par despite inadequate pub-
lic investment in urban districts. This picture is misleading, in that there is strong 
evidence that in relatively affluent communities, public investment in traditional 
public schools can and does result in excellence, including excellence in test 
scores.59 In the nation’s top public schools, per-pupil spending is often several 
times higher than in the nation’s large urban districts, where it is well know that 
children experience multiple academic disadvantages due to poverty.60 When dec-
larations of the “failure of public education” are made by advocates of choice and 
privatization, inevitably these declarations are targeted at urban districts, which 
are predominantly non-white and predominantly poor. In this sense, tinkering 
with unproven, unstudied, market-oriented experiments appears as an attempt at 
avoiding equalizing conditions in the most heavily invested-in public schools at-
tended by largely professional class whites and in the historically disinvested-in 
urban public schools. As Dorothy Shipps suggests, the history of business-led 
reform to public schooling in the United States over the course of the twentieth 
century has proven that “giving the market a chance” has resulted in present in-
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equalities.61 One can only speculate as to the potential positive effects of equaliz-
ing funding and resources so that all schools receive investment at the level of the 
most successful schools. 
Evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, the perception that American 
public schools are an unmitigated disaster has fostered the idea is it is worthwhile 
to try anything, including the most radical experiments, to improve U.S. public 
education. With discussions so dominated by business metaphors, “free market” 
methods have appeared particularly attractive, including teacher pay for grades 
(pay for performance) and contracted school management (contracting out). What 
is more, the business paradigm requires numerically measurable progress, so that 
test-based achievement comes to completely dominate pedagogy and curriculum. 
This kind of “bottom line” perspective not only elevates test scores to the highest 
educational value, but also may result in crowding out traditional ways of think-
ing about and defining education as an intellectual endeavor that involves investi-
gation, debate, and deliberation. A concern with students’ ability to think more 
deeply is replaced by a concern with how to produce higher test scores. 
With no positive evidence for either portfolio district approach or any of 
its constituent elements, and negative evidence for some elements, one is inclined 
to invoke Hippocrates dictum of “First, do no harm” to those considering imple-
menting these radical approaches. 
 
 
Recommendations 
Although the portfolio model is advocated by some policy centers, imple-
mented in some large urban districts, and appears to be supported by the Obama 
administration, no peer-reviewed studies of portfolio districts exist, meaning that 
no reliable empirical evidence about portfolio effects is available to support either 
the implementation or rejection of the portfolio district model. Nor is such evi-
dence likely to be forthcoming, since even advocates acknowledge the enormous 
difficulty of designing credible empirical studies to determine how the portfolio 
approach impacts student achievement and other outcomes. One portfolio district, 
New Orleans, has produced anecdotal reports of achievement gains. The New Or-
leans results have, however, been subjected to serious challenge. In addition, 
available piecemeal evidence and literature from the supporters of the model sug-
gest that the approach is expensive to implement and has unknown to negative ef-
fects on student achievement. Finally, extrapolation of research on constituent 
elements is unreliable, given complex interactions within a portfolio model; even 
there, however, no evidence is available to that the portfolio model will produce 
gains in achievement or fiscal efficiency. 
In light of these considerations, it is recommended that legislators and ad-
ministrators use great caution in considering the portfolio district approach. It is 
also highly recommended that before adopting such a strategy, decision makers 
ask the following questions. 
 What credible evidence do we have, or can we obtain, that suggests 
advantages for the portfolio model? What would those advantages be, 
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when might they be expected to materialize, and how might they be 
documented? 
 If constituent elements of the model (such as charter schools and test-
based accountability) have not produced advantages outside of portfo-
lio systems, what is the rationale for expecting improved outcomes as 
part of a portfolio system? 
 What funding will be needed for startup, and where will it come from? 
 What funding will be necessary for maintenance of the model? Where 
will continuation funds come from if startup funds expire and are not 
renewed? 
 What potential political and social conflicts seem possible? How will 
concerns of dissenting constituents be addressed? 
 How will the cost/benefit ratio of the model be determined? 
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